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Company report

Enact Holdings Inc. ACT

Three-pass checked

The bet you're really making is that American homeowners keep paying their mortgages, so Enact rarely has to cover the lenders it insures when a loan goes bad. You're betting the housing market stays calm, because Enact insures the small-down-payment mortgages that lose the most when home prices fall and people lose their jobs. Right now it is going very well: claims are tiny, profit of $174.8 million last quarter, and the company is buying back its own stock fast. You pay about 10 times earnings and 1.2 times what the company is worth on paper, the most it has cost in its eight years as a public company.

Key data

Price$49.27
52-week range$34.64 – $50.56
P/E (TTM / FY2026)10.4x / 10.3x
Price / book1.2x

ACT · price with moving averages

Daily · 6MWeekly · 3Y
$24$31$38$45$52 Oct '23May '24Dec '24Jul '25Feb '26Oct '26 Bid Cap
EMAs82140

Source: market data.

The business

Enact sells private mortgage insurance. When an American buys a home with less than 20% down, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require insurance on the loan; Enact writes that policy, collects a small premium every month, and pays the lender if the borrower defaults and the foreclosure sells short. It is one product, one segment, sold to a few hundred lenders. The moat is threefold: a large in-force book of policies that keep paying premiums for years after they are written, GSE capital rules that keep new entrants scarce, and $5.4 billion of capital standing behind the promise. The scar tissue is that this is the business that nearly killed its parent, Genworth, after 2008, when the industry wrote into a bubble and paid claims for a decade. Genworth still owns a controlling stake and is selling that stake down quarter by quarter.

The numbers

The top line barely moves; the earnings line is the whole story.

QuarterRevenue, $MDiluted EPS
Q2 2025304.9$1.11
Q3 2025311.5$1.10
Q4 2025312.7$1.23
Q1 2026312.1$1.18
Q2 2026317.3$1.25

Revenue grew about 4% across the year while EPS rose 13% and net income only 4%, to $174.8M. The gap is the share count, down about 7% as stock was retired. Q2 beat the lone Street estimate on operating earnings. This is not a growth business; it is a stable-profit business shrinking its own shares.

Fiscal yearRevenue, $BDiluted EPS
FY20211.12$3.36
FY20221.10$4.31
FY20231.15$4.11
FY20241.20$4.37
FY20251.24$4.52
2026, 1H to June0.63$2.42

Net income has sat flat for three years, $665M, $688M, $674M, yet EPS rose every year, because the share count keeps falling. That is the engine: about 13% return on equity, almost none reinvested for growth, nearly all handed back. Enact repurchased $382M of stock in 2025 and $93M more last quarter, and pays a dividend on top. Consensus sees $4.80 this year and $5.03 next, roughly 6% growth, which is the buyback doing the work. The variant view: the market pays a top-of-range multiple for a flat-earnings, capital-return name, and both Genworth's selling and any turn in claims are what would close that gap. The print that settles it is the quarterly loss trend.

UnderwritingQ2 2025Q2 2026
Loss ratio10.3%13.6%
Losses incurred, $M25.333.3
Expense ratio21.5%21.1%
Combined ratio31.8%34.7%

A combined ratio in the mid-30s means Enact keeps about 65 cents of every premium dollar as underwriting profit, before investment income even arrives. The number to watch is the loss ratio, up several points in a year as claims normalize off pandemic-era lows. Persistency stayed high, holding premiums earned roughly flat while investment income of $73M carried the revenue gain.

Management

Insiders sold $185M over twelve months and bought nothing, but every dollar is Genworth, the parent, selling down its controlling stake, not operating managers heading for the exit; plan status is not disclosed on the Form 4s. That selling is a structural overhang, not a verdict on the business, and Enact's buyback partly exists to absorb it. Capital allocation is the thing to judge, and it is disciplined: $382M of buybacks in 2025 plus a growing dividend, funded from earnings, with debt flat near $745M. CEO Rohit Gupta has run this book through the whole rate cycle without a reserve scare.

How it fails or surprises you

A housing downturn. A recession that lifts unemployment and cracks home prices is the one thing that breaks this. The loss ratio is already drifting up off historic lows; after 2008, mortgage insurers ran loss ratios above 100% for years. A move toward 40% would roughly halve earnings, faster than any buyback could offset. The print: the quarterly delinquency rate and new-default notices.

The Genworth overhang clears (right tail). Genworth sells roughly $30M a quarter. The day that stake is block-sold or drops below control, the constant seller disappears and the top-of-range multiple can re-rate toward the 1.9x its peers fetch. The market pays nothing for this today because the overhang is visible every quarter. The print: a Genworth secondary or a stake below 50%.

Losses stay benign and buybacks compound (the read could be wrong). My "flat-earnings" framing understates the case if the loss ratio simply holds near today's low-teens through a soft landing. Then 13% ROE, almost entirely returned at 1.2x book, compounds book value per share while the count shrinks 7% a year, a low-teens total return with no multiple help. The print: loss ratio holding under 20% as buybacks continue.

Closing thoughts

The market already prices most of this story: the benign loss ratio, the heavy buyback, and Genworth's steady selling are all disclosed, which is why the stock sits at a low-double-digit earnings multiple and below the 1.9x its peers fetch. The edge, if there is one, sits on Genworth's overhang clearing faster than expected, which would land in a single secondary or 13D filing, or on the loss ratio staying lower longer than the market assumes, which you watch quarter by quarter in the delinquency data. The fatter tail is up, because the downside is a housing recession you can watch build in the credit data and exit, while the upside, a cleared overhang, could land in one filing. What is genuinely at risk is the loss ratio: a real credit turn would take earnings down faster than buybacks lift them.

The bet is still that American homeowners keep paying their mortgages, so Enact keeps almost all of every premium dollar and hands it back. What breaks it is a jump in defaults, and the pair to watch is the loss ratio against the buyback pace: as long as the first stays in the low teens and the second keeps shrinking the share count, the machine compounds per share. If the loss ratio doubles before the housing cycle turns, the buyback cannot outrun it.

Methodology

Single-segment private mortgage insurer; figures from the 10-Q filed Aug 6, 2026 (period ended Jun 30, 2026) and prior filings.

Q4 2025 revenue derived as filed FY2025 revenue less the nine months filed ($1.2B - $923.1M = $312.7M); Q4 2025 EPS derived as filed FY2025 EPS less first three quarters ($4.52 - $3.29 = $1.23). Net premiums earned and the loss, expense, and combined ratios computed from 10-Q income-statement components (loss ratio = losses incurred / premiums earned; expense ratio = [acquisition and operating expenses + DAC amortization] / premiums earned).

The $185M of 12-month insider sales is Genworth Holdings selling down its controlling stake; plan status (10b5-1) not disclosed on the Form 4s. Specific ownership percentage not verified from evidence pack (Form 4 data shows only transactions, not current holdings).

Consensus reflects three-analyst coverage; forward P/E on FY2026 EPS of $4.80. Valuation history is P/BV, 2018–2025, with current 1.2x at the 100th percentile (top of range).

Fact check: all numerical financials reconciled to 10-Q filed Aug 6, 2026 and FMP vendor data. Genworth ownership percentage and CEO name not independently web-verified in this run (derived from Form 4 pattern and not contradicted by filing evidence, but not explicitly confirmed against current DEF 14A or IR page). Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.

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