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AST SpaceMobile, Inc. ASTS
At $68.65, the market pays $27.9B for a company that booked $71M of revenue last year, which is 394 times sales.
The bet stopped being about physics and became about financing: $2.99B of debt against $2.29B of cash, and a constellation that is not finished.
Key data
ASTS · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
AST SpaceMobile builds unusually large satellites that unfold in orbit and connect directly to an ordinary, unmodified mobile phone. No special handset, no rooftop terminal, and no new spectrum, because the network runs on frequencies the mobile operator already licenses. The customer is therefore the carrier, not the subscriber, and several of the world's largest operators have signed on as distribution partners rather than competitors.
Payment arrives first as committed carrier money and later as service revenue, and $252.1M already sits on the balance sheet as non-current deferred revenue. The engine is brutally simple: spend billions on hardware, then earn recurring wholesale fees once coverage is continuous. What changed is the funding mix. Through 2024 the build was paid for with equity; by June 2026 it carried $2.99B of debt, so the schedule now has creditors attached to it.
Business read. Revenue does not begin in earnest until the constellation is continuous, and financing bridges the gap.
Things you might not know
The reported loss understates the economics. FY2025 loss from continuing operations was $461.0M, but only $341.9M was attributable to AST, with $119.1M going to non-controlling interests inside the up-C structure. Minority interest carries $503.6M on the balance sheet, so the economic share count exceeds the reported one.
Founder Abel Avellan and his permitted transferees control roughly 71.6% of combined voting power through Class C stock, per the 2026 proxy. Outside holders funded a build that tripled the share count and still cannot outvote one person on the timing or terms of the next raise.
Accumulated deficit reached $1.25B while property and equipment, net, reached $2.09B, which says most of the money raised became hardware rather than burn. Revenue was exactly zero in 2023, so the entire commercial history of this company is twenty-four months old.
Fundamentals
| Measure | QoQ | YoY |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | not disclosed | up 1,511% |
| Operating loss | not disclosed | 18.5% wider |
| Net loss attributable | not disclosed | 14.0% wider |
| Diluted EPS | not disclosed | 30.9% less negative |
| Weighted average diluted shares | not disclosed | up 65.7% |
FY2025 was the first real revenue year, $70.9M against $4.4M, and it cost 65.7% more shares to get there. Losses widened at every line as the build accelerated, while diluted loss per share narrowed only because the denominator grew faster than the deficit. Quarterly comparisons are not carried here; the source works from annual filings, so QoQ is a genuine gap rather than a flat number.
Valuation
| Metric | Company | Peer median |
|---|---|---|
| Price to sales, FY2025 | 394x | not disclosed |
| Enterprise value to sales, FY2025 | 403x | not disclosed |
| Price to earnings, FY2025 | n/m, loss | not disclosed |
| Gross margin, FY2025 | 53.4% | not disclosed |
| Operating margin, FY2025 | negative 406% | not disclosed |
Comparable set for a later run: Iridium Communications, Globalstar, Viasat, EchoStar, and Telesat.
Peer medians were not pulled in this run, so the right column stays honest rather than filled. On the company side the point survives anyway: 403 times enterprise value to sales leaves no multiple to argue about, only a schedule to underwrite. Both operating measures are as-filed FY2025, which is why a healthy 53.4% gross margin sits beside an operating margin of negative 406%. The margin is real; the volume is not there yet.
Management
| Measure | Record |
|---|---|
| Capital allocation | $2.09B of property and equipment, net, funded by three years of escalating equity issuance through 2025 plus $2.99B of debt by the June 2026 quarter |
| Diluted shares | Weighted average 81.8M in 2023, 154.5M in 2024, 256.0M in 2025, up 213% in two years |
| Insider activity, 12mo | No disclosed open-market sales by Avellan; June 22, 2026 Form 4 reports AA Gables 2, LLC entering a variable prepaid forward on up to 2,500,000 Class A shares for roughly $146.7M upfront, floor $59.58 and cap $111.72, settling March 2028; 32,754 shares withheld at $113.41 for RSU taxes |
Compensation
| Horizon | Goals | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Annual cash, FY2025 | Revenue target of $75M for Messrs. Wisniewski, Johnson, and Gupta; Avellan has taken $0 base salary since April 2021 and no annual cash bonus | Revenue came in at $70.9M, paid at 95% of target, $475,000 each; Dr. Yao received a $150,000 discretionary bonus tied to the launch of five BlueBird Block 1 spacecraft |
| Latest completed long-term award | 2025 PSUs on satellites in orbit by the end of February 2026, connectivity standards, and the $75M revenue target; separately, modified 2024 PSUs measured to August 15, 2025 on revenue, capital raised, liquidity, satellite deployment, and share price | Satellites-in-orbit goal not achieved, that portion paid zero; connectivity standards paid 75%; revenue paid 95%. The modified 2024 PSUs vested at 150% of target for Wisniewski and Johnson |
The linchpins
Win big if
The constellation reaches continuous coverage on the cash already raised, carrier agreements convert, and the $252.1M of non-current deferred revenue begins moving into the revenue line while the equity base stays roughly where it is, which would turn the balance sheet from the story back into plumbing. The first observable proof is a full year with share count growth under 15% and no new equity raise. The confirming signal is deferred revenue declining as recognized revenue climbs, with a named carrier operating on a disclosed commercial timeline rather than a date that slides again.
Surprised down if
The service date moves again, roughly $300M a year of operating loss keeps eating into the $2.29B of cash, and the company returns to market at a price already 48.7% below its high, issuing far more shares per dollar than the last raise did, on top of $2.99B of debt that sits ahead of the common in any restructuring. The first observable proof is a financing announced before service revenue begins. The confirming signal is a major carrier partner renegotiating or stepping back, which removes the distribution advantage the entire model rests on.
Last word
At 394 times sales, the market has already paid for the satellites that have not launched yet.
Methodology
Compressed from the finished Back of Napkin on ASTS dated 2026-08-22, which sources financials to AST SpaceMobile's Form 10-K filed 2026-03-02 (FY ended 2025-12-31), prior annual filings, and the Form 10-Q filed 2026-08-10 (quarter ended 2026-06-30); price is the 2026-08-21 close. Management, compensation, and insider fields were absent from that source and were filled from official materials: the DEF 14A filed April 2026 (sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001780312/000149315226019384/formdef14a.htm) and the Form 4 dated 2026-06-22. Enterprise value to sales, the YoY percentage changes, and the operating margin are computations from as-filed inputs. Peer medians, the debt maturity schedule, covenants, current satellite count, and the commercial service timeline were not pulled and are marked as gaps. Not investment advice.
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