CLCompany report
ClearPoint Neuro, Inc. CLPT
The bet you're really making is that brain surgeons keep choosing ClearPoint's system to steer needles and electrodes into exact spots in the brain while the patient lies inside an MRI scanner. You're betting the drug companies building gene therapies for brain diseases pay ClearPoint to deliver those drugs through its catheters, because the money is in the single-use parts each surgery burns, not the machines already sitting in hospitals. Right now it is going only okay, with one thing to watch: sales grew 18% over the year but slipped from the quarter before, and the loss widened to its biggest ever at 38 cents a share. It has never earned a profit, so you pay about ten times a year's sales, near the low end of its range after the stock fell by half from last year's high.
Key data
CLPT · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
ClearPoint sells the guidance layer for surgery done inside an MRI machine. A hospital buys the navigation console and software once, then buys disposable kits, the aiming frame, the needle guides, the catheters, every time a surgeon uses it to place a deep-brain-stimulation electrode, take a biopsy, or infuse a drug into a precise spot. That razor-and-blade shape is the whole economics: gross margin runs about 63%, and the installed base is what compounds. The second leg, the one the multiple is really paying for, is drug delivery. When a biopharma partner develops a gene or cell therapy that has to be injected into brain tissue, ClearPoint's catheter is the delivery tool, and it collects development fees now and a per-procedure cut later. Partners named in the filings include Boston Scientific and Blackrock Neurotech. The moat is the installed console plus the regulatory work already done on the delivery hardware; a partner mid-trial does not swap it out.
The numbers
Revenue has roughly doubled in three years, but the loss has widened in a straight line while it did.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $9.2M | −$5.8M | −$0.21 |
| Q3 2025 | $8.9M | −$5.9M | −$0.21 |
| Q4 2025 | $10.4M | −$7.8M | −$0.27 |
| Q1 2026 | $12.1M | −$9.6M | −$0.32 |
| Q2 2026 | $10.9M | −$11.3M | −$0.38 |
The inflection is the wrong kind. Revenue is lumpy, up 18% against last year's quarter but down 10% from Q1, while the loss has deepened every single quarter for a year. The engine is operating cost: spending grew 53% year over year in Q2, and selling and administrative cost alone, $12.3M, now exceeds revenue. Each print has missed the modest loss the Street penciled in.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $16.3M | −$14.4M | −$0.69 |
| 2022 | $20.6M | −$16.4M | −$0.68 |
| 2023 | $24.0M | −$22.1M | −$0.90 |
| 2024 | $31.4M | −$18.9M | −$0.70 |
| 2025 | $37.0M | −$25.5M | −$0.90 |
| 2026, 1H | $23.0M | −$20.9M | −$0.70 |
Revenue compounded about 23% a year across those five years, and the loss per share is exactly where it was in 2021. That is the argument in one line: five years of top-line growth bought no progress toward breakeven, and cash burn more than doubled to $24M in 2025. What this memo believes that the price does not is that the drug-delivery option, not the surgical razor-blade business, has to carry the entire premium, and the single print that settles it is a partnered therapy actually reaching patients.
The lens is the spend against its denominator: research is falling as a share of sales, which is the one thing working.
| Fiscal year | R&D | R&D % of revenue |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $9.3M | 57% |
| 2023 | $11.7M | 49% |
| 2025 | $13.9M | 38% |
Management
The record here is a caution flag. Insiders sold about $2.5M of stock over the last year across nine sales and bought nothing; CEO Joseph Burnett accounted for the three largest, including $1.1M in June 2026. The available filings do not mark which of those ran under a preset 10b5-1 plan, so planned and discretionary cannot be separated cleanly, and that ambiguity itself is worth noting when the buying side is empty. Share count has climbed 17% in three years, which is how the burn has been funded, and interest cost has jumped to $1.4M a quarter as debt came on to bridge the rest. The one comp figure in hand names a CEO who left a decade ago, so it says nothing about today.
How it fails or surprises you
The cash runs low. Cash sits near $29M against a burn that ran $24M last year and is running wider in 2026's first half. That is roughly a year of runway before another raise, and the last five years say the raise comes as stock. The print that tells you first is the cash balance and any financing line in the Q3 10-Q.
The top line has stalled, not paused. Revenue fell 10% from Q1 to Q2 as the loss hit its widest. Capital-equipment and partner fees are lumpy, so one soft quarter is not proof, but if Q3 does not reclaim the $12M Q1 level, the 23% growth story that justifies ten times sales is the thing that breaks.
A partnered brain therapy reaches the market (right tail). If one of the gene therapies ClearPoint delivers wins approval and scales, every dose flows through its catheter at high margin into a cost base already built. The market pays almost nothing for this today because the timelines sit in 2027 and beyond. A partner's pivotal readout or a filing naming ClearPoint delivery is the first tell.
Closing thoughts
Two things are stacked here: a near-term question a print resolves, whether the company funds itself without punishing dilution, and a longer exposure no single print settles, whether MRI-guided drug delivery becomes a real market at all. The cash-against-burn item was the thing to watch a couple of weeks back, and nothing has resolved it: no new quarter has printed since, the stock has slipped from about $16 to $14, and the runway arithmetic has only tightened. The fatter tail near-term is the left one, a financing on weak terms; the right tail is real but dated, and you are paid to wait through the burn to see it.
The bet is still that surgeons keep reaching for ClearPoint's system inside the scanner, and that drug companies keep paying to deliver through its catheters. It breaks if the disposables business stops growing before the drug-delivery money arrives, and the pair that tells you is quarterly revenue against the cash balance: the day revenue is flat and cash is under a year, the premium has nothing holding it up.
Methodology
Medical-device and drug-delivery frame: MRI-guided neuro navigation, disposable pull-through, biopharma delivery optionality. Anchor filings: Q2 2026 results and Form 10-Q filed 2026-08-03, fiscal 2025 Form 10-K filed 2026-03-17. Insider activity from Forms 4 through 2026-06-29; 10b5-1 status not distinguishable from available data. Price $13.96 and market cap $418.7M are vendor market data as of 2026-09-06; trailing figures computed from as-filed statements. Data gaps: revenue by segment and partner-program count are not in this bundle. Fact check: 1 approximation corrected (cash burn growth 2024→2025 stated as 'nearly tripled', actual 2.65x, corrected to 'more than doubled'). All bundle financials reconciled to FMP; CEO and partners verified against profile/10-K. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
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