DPCompany report
Domino's Pizza, Inc. DPZ
The bet you're really making is that Domino's keeps getting more Americans to order more pizzas, one carryout at a time, and that the franchisees who run nearly all of its stores keep opening new locations. Underneath, you're betting the money engine holds: Domino's takes a cut of every franchised store's sales and sells them the dough and the boxes, so more orders and more stores mean more profit without Domino's paying to build anything. Right now the business is going sideways: US customers are ordering more often, but total sales grew just 4% last quarter, and international same-store sales went negative. You pay 19 times last year's earnings, and on cash profits the stock is cheaper than any year since 2014.
Key data
DPZ · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
Domino's sells pizza, and almost none of it from stores it owns. The business is heavily franchised: a franchisee buys the right to open a Domino's, pays a royalty on every dollar of sales, and buys dough, cheese, sauce and boxes from Domino's own supply-chain centers. Three streams come back: US royalties and fees, a large supply-chain business that resells food to US franchisees at a markup, and international royalties. The supply-chain arm is the biggest by revenue and the least glamorous, a trucking-and-commissary operation earning thin margins on big volume. The moat is scale: the biggest pizza system in the world buys ingredients cheaper, advertises on a bigger budget, and has spent twenty years building the ordering technology that most US orders now flow through digitally. The thing a customer actually touches, a $6.99 carryout placed on an app, is the cheap, repeatable transaction the entire machine is tuned to multiply.
The numbers
The story splits cleanly between what the business does and what the share count does.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $1.15B | $131.1M | $3.81 |
| Q3 2025 | $1.15B | $139.3M | $4.08 |
| Q4 2025 | $1.54B | $181.6M | $5.35 |
| Q1 2026 | $1.15B | $139.8M | $4.13 |
| Q2 2026 | $1.19B | $135.8M | $4.07 |
Revenue grew 4.3% in the June quarter against a year earlier, net income 3.6%, diluted EPS 6.8%. June EPS also came in under the $4.17 estimate, the third miss in four reports. Underneath the flat top line sits the one number the pizza business turns on: US same-store sales driven by higher transaction counts, offset by lower average ticket. Traffic is the honest signal, and it is positive. International is not: same-store sales excluding currency fell 0.1% in the quarter, rolling over a 2.4% gain a year earlier.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | $4.36B | $510.5M | $13.54 |
| FY2022 | $4.54B | $452.3M | $12.53 |
| FY2023 | $4.48B | $519.1M | $14.66 |
| FY2024 | $4.71B | $584.2M | $16.69 |
| FY2025 | $4.94B | $601.7M | $17.57 |
| 2026, 1H to Jun | $2.35B | $275.6M | $8.20 |
Across four years revenue compounded at 3.2% a year and net income at 4.2%, while diluted EPS compounded at 6.7%. The gap is buybacks.
| Measure, FY21 to FY25 | Change |
|---|---|
| Revenue | +13.4% |
| Net income | +17.9% |
| Diluted EPS | +29.8% |
| Diluted shares | −9.2% |
The share count fell about 9%, and repurchases ran $357.7M last year against an $11.3B market value. The concern that per-share growth is mostly the count shrinking rather than the business growing held over the last two days of fresh reading: revenue up 4.3%, EPS up 6.8%, buybacks closing the difference. The quieter bright spot is margin, widening from 16.9% operating margin in FY2022 to 19.3% in FY2025 as high-margin royalties outgrow low-margin supply-chain resale. The variant is modest: the market prices Domino's as a low-single-digit grower that returns cash, and on the evidence that is close to right. What the multiple may under-weight is that US traffic turned positive while the stock derated. US same-store transactions over the next two quarters settle it.
Management
Russell Weiner runs Domino's, and the insider ledger points one way: zero open-market purchases in the last year against 23 sales worth $11.8M, with Weiner selling $3.59M on July 17 and a second officer about $2.3M five days later, both within weeks of the June report. Plan status is not disclosed in the feed, so read those as sales, not signals, but note that nobody with a desk inside the company is adding here. Where management is genuinely shareholder-friendly is capital return: buybacks ran $357.7M last fiscal year and $75.1M in the first quarter of 2026, funded by a securitized balance sheet carrying roughly $5B of net debt, about five times EBITDA. That leverage is a deliberate choice, not distress, and the royalty stream is steady enough to service it. The guidance record is less flattering: EPS landed below the estimate in three of the last four quarters.
How it fails or surprises you
US traffic rolls back over. The thesis rests on US transaction counts staying positive, because ticket is already negative. If value-seekers who returned for cheap deals fade when promotions end, US same-store sales go negative and the royalty stream that carries the margin story stalls. Watch US same-store transactions in the next two prints. One clearly negative quarter breaks it.
International same-store sales stay negative. International same-store went negative this quarter, and those royalties are the highest-margin dollars in the model. If this is a trend, not a currency-year wobble, the growth half of the story is gone and what remains is a slow US annuity paying out through buybacks. Watch international same-store sales.
US same-store reaccelerates (right tail). Transactions are already positive while the stock sits 27% below its 52-week high at a 12-year-low cash-profit multiple. If the loyalty and aggregator-delivery push drives mid-single-digit transaction growth for two or three quarters, EPS growth jumps toward the low teens on the buyback leverage and the 15x forward multiple re-rates. The market is not paying for this. Watch US same-store above 3%.
Closing thoughts
The market is pricing what the numbers show: a low-growth franchisor that returns cash. Revenue has grown 3% a year for four years, and the EPS outpaced it only because the share count shrank 9%. The person selling to you here is handing over a durable annuity at its cheapest cash-profit multiple in twelve years because the growth has gone quiet. The left tail is not a blow-up, it is dead money: a business that grows earnings 4% and manufactures the rest through buybacks while paying five-times-EBITDA of debt to do it. The fatter tail is the right one, and it is not large: US traffic is already positive, and a couple of quarters of mid-single-digit same-store growth is all it takes to turn a 15x forward multiple back into a compounder's. At risk if US traffic rolls over is the entire re-rate case. Worth, if traffic holds, a low-teens return from earnings growth plus the 3% buyback.
The bet is still that Domino's gets more Americans to order more pizzas and keeps its franchise system growing. It breaks if the two numbers that matter part ways: US same-store transactions turning negative, or international same-store sales staying negative for multiple quarters. Watch that pair together, because if US traffic fades while international stays flat, there is no engine left but the share count, and no buyback rescues a franchise that has stopped selling more pizza.
Methodology
Sector frame: consumer, judged on same-store traffic versus ticket, unit economics, and demand trend against the stock's move.
Data gaps: segment revenue mix (US Stores, International Franchise, Supply Chain) is described qualitatively in the 10-Q but quantified figures were not pulled this run; store count and franchisee percentage were not pulled this run. Q4 2025 figures derived as fiscal year 2025 less the sum of Q1–Q3 2025.
Bundle: FY2021 through FY2025 annual statements, the last five reported quarters through Q2 2026 (period ended Jun 14, 2026, filed Jul 20, 2026), insider Form 4 activity, and live quote as of Sep 6, 2026.
Sources: revenue, EPS, margins, operating income, buyback and share-count history from the as-filed annual and quarterly XBRL; same-store sales and transaction/ticket commentary from the 10-Q; insider sales from the Form 4 record; consensus and surprise history from the vendor estimate feed; EV/EBITDA history from the valuation series.
Fact check: consolidated financials reconciled to as-filed XBRL; same-store sales commentary (higher transaction counts, lower average ticket, international down 0.1%) verified against Jun 2026 10-Q filing text; share count decline corrected from -9.3% to -9.2% (calculated -9.19%); EV/EBITDA current 16.6x versus 12-year range 17.5x to 28.9x confirms the cheapest cash-profit multiple in the available history; insider plan status not disclosed in the feed, reported as sales without signal weight; management role and store count metrics not independently verified from primary sources. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
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