FICompany report
Fair Isaac Corporation FICO
The bet you're really making is that almost every mortgage lender in America still has to buy a FICO score to approve a home loan, and that FICO can keep raising what it charges. You're betting that Washington's decision to let a rival score, VantageScore, into those same mortgages does not actually pull lenders away, because the machinery of home lending is built around FICO's number. Right now the price increases are working: sales up 26% and profit up 30% last quarter year-over-year, with more than half of every dollar of sales turning into profit. You pay about 27 times the past year's earnings, less than half the multiple the market paid a year ago and near the middle of the stock's twelve-year range on cash profits.
Key data
FICO · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
Fair Isaac sells two things. The first is the FICO score, the three-digit number American lenders pull to decide who gets a mortgage, a car loan, or a credit card. Lenders buy it through the three credit bureaus, and for a home loan the government-backed mortgage buyers have required a FICO score for decades, which is why this behaves like a toll on lending rather than a product anyone shops for. It costs almost nothing to produce another score, so nearly every extra dollar of Scores revenue falls to profit. The second business is software: the FICO Platform, decisioning tools, and the Falcon fraud system, sold to banks by subscription. That side grew its annual recurring revenue 10% to $815.8 million with net retention of 109%, steady but ordinary. The whole company's swing factor is the first business, and specifically the price per score. In late 2025 FICO raised the mortgage price sharply, and the 2026 numbers are what came back.
The numbers
The quarters show one inflection, and it is the mortgage price hike landing in March 2026.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 FY25 (Mar '25) | $498.7M | $162.6M | $6.59 |
| Q3 FY25 (Jun '25) | $536.4M | $181.8M | $7.40 |
| Q1 FY26 (Dec '25) | $512.0M | $158.4M | $6.61 |
| Q2 FY26 (Mar '26) | $691.7M | $264.5M | $11.14 |
| Q3 FY26 (Jun '26) | $674.2M | $237.2M | $10.45 |
Revenue was drifting sideways near $510 million a quarter, then jumped to $692 million the quarter the higher mortgage royalty took hold, and profit rose faster than sales because the extra dollars carried almost no cost. Adjusted profit has come in above analyst estimates in each of the last four quarters, by as much as 15% in the March quarter. Recurring revenue reached $1.2 billion over the nine months, up 45%, which tells you the price, not just the volume, is doing the work.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | $1.32B | $392.1M | $13.40 |
| FY2022 | $1.38B | $373.5M | $14.18 |
| FY2023 | $1.51B | $429.4M | $16.93 |
| FY2024 | $1.72B | $512.8M | $20.45 |
| FY2025 | $1.99B | $651.9M | $26.54 |
| FY2026, 9M to Jun | $1.88B | $660.0M | $28.20 |
Over four years revenue compounded about 11% annually while diluted earnings compounded 19%, the gap being margin and a share count cut by buybacks. Nine months into FY2026 the company has already earned more than all of FY2025. What the market does not believe is that this survives contact with VantageScore. The print that settles it is the mortgage Scores royalty and origination volume over the next two quarters: if lenders keep paying the higher price, the fear was mispriced.
The engine has been buybacks, and lately they have been borrowed.
| Period | Long-term debt | Cash |
|---|---|---|
| Jun 2025 | $2.78B | $189M |
| Sep 2025 | $3.06B | $134M |
| Dec 2025 | $3.20B | $162M |
| Mar 2026 | $3.64B | $219M |
| Jun 2026 | $5.58B | $248M |
Long-term debt nearly doubled in a year, most of it in the June quarter, to buy back stock. FICO spent $1.4 billion on repurchases in FY2025 at prices well above today's $932, and now carries net debt near 4.2 times cash earnings against a book equity that buybacks have pushed negative.
Management
Will Lansing has run FICO since 2012 and has been consistent about one thing: shrink the share count relentlessly. That worked while the stock was cheap and looks worse in hindsight now that a chunk was retired near the top with borrowed money. Insiders sold $6.0 million over the last year with no purchases, the largest a $2.6 million sale by director Steven Weber in December and two by CFO Eva Manolis totaling $2.3 million; plan status is not disclosed on any of them. The sales are small against a $20 billion company and read as routine. The harder question the record raises is capital allocation discipline, not intent.
How it fails or surprises you
VantageScore walks through the open door. The clearance last flagged as a watch-item has now landed: the FHFA has cleared VantageScore 4.0 for government-backed mortgages, so the question is no longer whether the door opens but whether lenders and bond investors migrate. If they do, the higher royalty that drove the entire FY2026 surge reverses. The mortgage Scores line over the next two quarters shows it first.
The borrowed buybacks. Debt doubled to $5.58 billion against $248 million of cash and negative book equity. If VantageScore compresses Scores earnings while rates stay high, the leverage that flatters today's per-share numbers becomes the fragile part. Watch interest coverage and whether debt keeps climbing next quarter.
Price and volume both turn (right tail). Mortgage originations sit near multi-decade lows, and FICO raised the per-score price into that trough. If rates fall and refinancing returns while VantageScore stays marginal, Scores revenue re-accelerates on price and volume at once. The stock at a 52-week low pays nothing for this. Origination Scores volume reveals it.
Closing thoughts
VantageScore is cleared but adoption is unknown, and the mortgage Scores line over the next two quarters shows whether lenders move or stay. The left tail, real defection, is what halved the stock; the right tail, the scare fading while price and volume compound, is not priced at all. The near-term odds favor continued pricing power, because government buyers, bond investors, and lender systems are all wired to FICO and that plumbing moves slowly, and the FY2026 numbers show the price hike holding after the clearance, not before it. That is a judgment, not a certainty. What raises the cost of being wrong is the balance sheet: if the mortgage rent compresses, it compresses over a doubled debt load.
The bet is still that American mortgage lenders keep buying FICO's score and keep paying more for it, and that VantageScore's clearance does not turn into real defection. What breaks it is the mortgage Scores line rolling over while VantageScore adoption climbs, and the one pair of numbers that tells you first is the per-score mortgage royalty against origination Scores volume. If both hold through FY2027, the market sold a monopoly at 27 times earnings because it was afraid of a door that no one walked through.
Methodology
_Figures from FICO's 10-Q filed Jul 29, 2026 (period ended Jun 30, 2026), as-filed XBRL for five fiscal years and the last five quarters, and live market and consensus data as of Sep 5, 2026._ _Scores/Software split, recurring revenue and ARR are as the company reports them; adjusted EPS is the non-GAAP figure._ _EV/EBITDA and leverage are derived from market data and the filed balance sheet; the 12-year valuation band is on the pack's EV/EBITDA basis._ _VantageScore/FHFA context reflects the competitive event behind the stock's decline; adoption figures are not yet disclosed by the company._ _Insider sales from Form 4 records over the trailing 12 months; 10b5-1 plan status not disclosed in the feed._
Fact check: bundle financials reconciled to filed XBRL; all revenue, earnings, balance sheet, and growth calculations verified. Critical qualitative claims (CEO tenure, FHFA clearance timing) not independently web-verified due to tool access. Final analysis verified as of Sep 5, 2026.
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