GDCompany report
Green Dot Corporation GDOT
The bet you're really making is that Green Dot is worth more than the market says, because it owns a bank and a cash-reload network that still throw off real money, and it is working to complete two proposed deals it is paying executives to stay through. You're betting its fast revenue growth, up 18% last quarter, turns into profit instead of staying cheap, low-margin volume from a few big partners. Right now it looks mixed: sales keep climbing, but the company lost money again on paper and last quarter came in soft. You pay about nine times next year's hoped-for profit and less than its own assets are worth, though on this year's near-zero earnings it looks expensive.
Key data
GDOT · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
Green Dot is a bank holding company that earns money three ways. Its Consumer segment sells prepaid cards and GO2bank checking accounts through tens of thousands of retail doors and online, earning monthly fees and interchange when the card is swiped. Money Movement runs the Green Dot Network, the cash-in, cash-out rail where someone loads paper money onto a card at a Walmart register, plus a large tax-refund processing business that swells every spring. The third leg, Banking-as-a-Service, rents Green Dot's bank charter and payment rails to other companies that put their own brand on the account. That B2B leg is the growth engine and the puzzle at once: it adds transaction volume quickly but keeps a thin slice of each dollar, so total revenue can climb while the profit underneath barely moves. The durable advantage is the charter paired with the physical reload network, expensive and slow to copy, which is exactly why partners rent it rather than build it. What the customer actually holds is a plastic reloadable card, or an app a partner badges as its own.
The numbers
Revenue has risen every year, from $1.43B in 2021 to $2.08B in 2025, and the first half of 2026 is running about 18% ahead of a year earlier. The five most recent quarters show what that growth is and is not.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $504M | -$47M | -$0.85 |
| Q3 2025 | $495M | -$31M | -$0.56 |
| Q4 2025 | $523M | -$47M | -$0.84 |
| Q1 2026 | $656M | $54M | $0.93 |
| Q2 2026 | $596M | -$2M | -$0.04 |
Read the net-income column, not the revenue one. The top line grows steadily, but earnings lurch: a $53.8M profit in the tax-season first quarter, then roughly breakeven in Q2, whose adjusted $0.26 fell short of the $0.37 expected after a strong Q1. Zoom out and the pattern is starker.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.43B | $47M | $0.85 |
| 2022 | $1.45B | $64M | $1.19 |
| 2023 | $1.50B | $7M | $0.13 |
| 2024 | $1.72B | -$27M | -$0.50 |
| 2025 | $2.08B | -$99M | -$1.79 |
| 2026, 1H to Jun | $1.25B | $52M | $0.89 |
Operating income improved in 2025, to $13.7M from a small 2024 loss, yet net income sank to a $98.9M loss. The gap sits below the operating line: a regulatory penalty and the cost of the ongoing anti-money-laundering remediation the filing describes, plus tax. Strip those and the operating business is roughly flat to modestly profitable, not collapsing. It also generates cash, about $138M from operations in 2025, and generated about $116M of free cash flow to equity on a trailing-twelve-month basis, a 15% yield against the current market value of $756M. The stock is priced at 0.8 times its own assets. One caveat matters: most of the roughly $1.14B of cash on the balance sheet is customer deposits and settlement balances held inside the bank, not shareholder money, so the cushion is smaller than it looks. And the float is moving.
| Quarter-end | Cash & equivalents |
|---|---|
| Jun 2025 | $2.31B |
| Sep 2025 | $1.64B |
| Dec 2025 | $1.42B |
| Mar 2026 | $1.65B |
| Jun 2026 | $1.14B |
Bank cash bulges in the first quarter and drains after, but the year-over-year comparison is the tell: $2.31B last June against $1.14B this June, down more than half. Some is seasonal, but a deposit base shrinking that fast while headline revenue grows is the central tension. The variant is simple: the market prices Green Dot as a shrinking prepaid relic at a third of sales, while the evidence says a cash-generative bank whose reported losses are dominated by non-recurring penalties. The print that settles it is B2B segment profit, whether the fast volume finally pays.
Management
Management's own money says little and its pay says more. Insiders sold about $268K over the past year, two small dispositions in November by Fanlo and Brewster, with no open-market buys and plan status not disclosed, nothing to read as conviction either way. The louder signal is in the filings: Green Dot is accruing retention and officer compensation tied to two proposed transactions with counterparties it names as CommerceOne and Smith Ventures. Paying people to stay through a deal is the language of a change of control or a carve-out, not business as usual. Meanwhile the board let a year of GAAP earnings absorb the regulatory and AML load rather than contest it, a choice that clears an overhang at a steep reported cost.
How it fails or surprises you
A deal closes above today's price (right tail). The stock sits at 0.8 times its assets while the company works to complete two named proposed transactions and pays executives to stay through them. If either is a sale or carve-out struck near the roughly $16.70 of assets behind each share, the gap to today's $13.33 closes fast. The market pays nothing for this today. The print: an 8-K with terms.
The growth is thin-margin partner volume. Revenue rose 18% last quarter, but Q2's soft profit is the first crack suggesting the incremental dollar is low-take Banking-as-a-Service volume concentrated in a few partners. The print: B2B segment profit, year over year, next 10-Q.
The deposit base is eroding, not just seasonal. Bank cash fell from $2.31B to $1.14B year over year. If accounts and deposits are genuinely leaving, not merely timing around tax season, the platform is hollowing while revenue flatters it, and the float that funds the model shrinks. This is the fact my read explains least well. The print: average deposits and active-account counts in the next filing.
Closing thoughts
What you own here is two things at once. One is a bank priced below the worth of its own pieces, cash-generative, that could be repriced the moment a transaction is announced. The other is an unanswered question, whether the fast Banking-as-a-Service growth ever converts to profit. The market pays almost nothing for the first, which is where the thicker tail sits: at 0.8 times assets with two named deals in motion, what the parts are worth cushions the fall, while the gain needs a deal or a margin turn to appear. The other tail is real, a bank earning a negative return on equity that stays lossmaking and keeps shedding deposits, in which case below-assets is a trap, because assets that earn nothing deserve the discount. Which tail is fatter is judgment: the pending transactions tip it toward the upside, and their terms, once disclosed, will move the stock more than any single quarter.
The bet is still that Green Dot is worth more than the market says, and that its growing revenue turns into profit rather than staying cheap partner volume. What breaks it is the pair to watch: B2B segment profit against total deposits. If segment profit rises while deposits stabilize, the cash-machine reading holds. If revenue keeps climbing while both segment profit and deposits fall, the growth was empty and the discount was earned. You will know which from the next two filings, well before any transaction closes.
Methodology
The year-to-date row is the sum of the 2 reported quarters of the current fiscal year, diluted EPS included; the five-quarter and five-year tables are the vendor income statements.
Data window: as-filed XBRL through the 10-Q filed 2026-08-10 (period 2026-06-30); market, consensus and insider data as of 2026-09-06.
Derivations: Q4 2025 revenue ($523M), net income (-$46.8M) and operating income (-$27.7M) derived as FY2025 less the filed nine months. Quarterly diluted EPS computed at about 56.7M shares (market cap / price); annual table shows operating income in place of EPS to isolate the below-the-line charges.
Free cash flow and yield are TTM figures from vendor keyMetrics (FCF to equity $116M, 15.4% yield), not FY2025 annuals (which show operating cash flow of $138.6M less capex of $72.5M for FCF of $66M, an 8.7% yield on current market cap).
Consensus is thin: forward revenue and EPS rest on a single analyst estimate; adjusted (non-GAAP) EPS drives the Street figures and differs from the GAAP net income tabled here.
Data gaps: segment-level net revenue and profit, GO2bank active-account and deposit counts, and the terms of the CommerceOne / Smith Ventures transactions are not in the pulled bundle and would sharpen the take-rate and catalyst read.
Sources: GDOT 10-Q filed 2026-08-10 and FY2021-FY2025 as-filed income, cash-flow and balance-sheet series; vendor quote, ratios and insider feed used only where no filing states the figure.
Fact check: FCF timeframe corrected from FY2025 ($66M) to TTM ($116M) to match the 15% yield cited; cash description clarified to distinguish balance-sheet cash ($1.14B) from shareholder equity; CommerceOne and Smith Ventures transaction names verified against 10-Q filing text. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
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