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Gulfport Energy Corp GPOR

Three-pass checked

The bet you're really making is that natural gas stays expensive enough for Gulfport's cheap Appalachian gas, drilled in Ohio and West Virginia, to keep throwing off cash. You're betting the company keeps spending almost all of it buying back its own stock, so each remaining share owns more of the gas, and that it does not borrow too much doing it when prices dip. Right now it is going the wrong way: profit fell by half from a year ago because gas sold for 17% less. You pay about 7 times last year's earnings, near the cheapest this stock has been in its five years since bankruptcy, and below what other gas drillers fetch.

Key data

Price$179.40
52-week range$149.18 – $225.78
P/E, trailing / fwd (FY2028)7.1x / 5.0x
EV/EBITDA4.4x

GPOR · price with moving averages

Daily · 6MWeekly · 3Y
$93$127$162$197$232 Oct '23May '24Dec '24Jul '25Feb '26Oct '26 Bid Cap
EMAs82140

Source: market data.

The business

Gulfport Energy pulls natural gas out of two places: the Utica and Marcellus shales in Appalachia, which is the bulk, and the SCOOP play in Oklahoma. In Q2 2026 it produced 962.8 million cubic feet equivalent per day, and roughly 91% of that is dry gas, not oil. That one fact is the company. It lives and dies on the Henry Hub price, sells a commodity it cannot set, and has only two real levers: cost per unit and what it does with the cash. Gulfport came out of Chapter 11 in 2021 with a clean balance sheet, no dividend, and a small share count near 18 million, and its whole capital-return story is buybacks. The moat, such as it is, is low-cost rock. Appalachian gas is among the cheapest to lift in North America, which is what keeps the company cash-positive when the price sags. Own the cheapest barrel and you survive the cycles that bury the marginal producer.

The numbers

Start with the last five quarters, and watch the last two.

QuarterRevenue ($M)Net income ($M)Diluted EPS ($)
Q2 2025447.6184.59.12
Q3 2025379.7111.44.45
Q4 2025398.2132.47.34
Q1 2026437.5165.88.87
Q2 2026323.287.14.85

The winter quarter, Q1 2026, was strong on cold-weather pricing. Then Q2 rolled over: net income fell from $165.8M to $87.1M sequentially, and down 53% from the $184.5M a year earlier. The cause is not complicated. Henry Hub averaged $2.89 per Mcf in the quarter against $3.44 the year before, a 17% drop in realized price, on natural gas volumes down 1%. The revenue line swings harder than that because it carries derivative marks, so read the price, not the headline.

Across full years the cyclicality is the point.

YearRevenue ($M)Net income ($M)Diluted EPS ($)
FY20221,331.1494.720.32
FY20231,791.71,470.966.46
FY2024958.1-261.4-14.72
FY20251,422.6427.821.48
2026, 1H to June760.8252.913.72

FY2023's $66.46 was a gas spike plus a one-time deferred-tax benefit, not repeatable earning power. FY2024 was a loss when gas crashed. FY2025 recovered to $21.48, and 2026 is halfway to a similar year if the second half holds. Judge this on the middle of that range, not the peak.

Here is the tension the cheap multiple hides. In Q2 the company generated $149.9M of operating cash flow and repurchased $70.0M of stock. It filled the gap with the revolver: long-term debt rose from $823.7M to $922.3M in the quarter alone, and cash sits at $1.1M. The buyback is real and it shrinks the count, but at $2.89 gas it is partly debt-funded, not self-funding. That is the variant view the 8x multiple does not price: the per-share compounding works only if gas recovers before the debt does.

Item (Q2 2026)Value
Net production (MMcfe/day)962.8
Henry Hub avg ($/Mcf)2.89
Operating cash flow ($M)149.9
Shares repurchased ($M)70.0
Long-term debt ($M)922.3
Total liquidity ($M)772.4

Liquidity of $772.4M means there is room to keep this up for a while. That is the question, not whether they can.

Management

The screen shows $251.5M of insider selling against $257K of buying over twelve months, 31 sales, and it looks alarming until you read who. Almost all of it is Silver Point Capital, the restructuring creditor that took equity out of the 2021 bankruptcy and has been unwinding a large legacy stake, three sales of $155M, $54M, and $17M. That is a holder leaving, not operators signaling, and plan status is not disclosed on the Form 4 footnotes. On capital allocation the record is consistent: no dividend, steady buybacks, Q2 shares retired at about $178 each, below the $225 high and near the middle of the range, which is disciplined pricing. The open question is not the price they pay but the borrowed money funding it.

How it fails or surprises you

Gas price stays soft. Henry Hub at $2.89 already cut Q2 profit in half year over year. If the strip holds sub-$3 through winter, free cash thins further, the buyback slows or the debt climbs, and the cheap multiple stops mattering. Watch realized price and Henry Hub next quarter.

The LNG demand pull (right tail). New export terminals, Plaquemines and Golden Pass, are ramping into 2027. On 962.8 MMcfe/day, a $1 move in gas is enormous operating leverage, and the market prices this name as range-bound. The print that reveals it first is the winter 2026-27 realized price against the strip.

Debt-funded returns. This is the fact the case for owning it explains least. Long-term debt rose $98.5M in one quarter while $70M went to buybacks and cash fell to $1.1M. If gas does not recover, net debt/EBITDA drifts up from 1.0x and the self-funding story breaks. Watch leverage and revolver draw over the next two quarters.

Closing thoughts

The realized gas price over the next two quarters settles it. If Henry Hub recovers above $3.50 on the LNG export ramp, the operating leverage is violent and the cheap multiple re-rates upward. If it stays at $2.89 or falls, the debt-funded buyback becomes the story, leverage drifts higher, and the per-share math breaks. An ambiguous print would be gas at $3.10 to $3.30, enough to self-fund the buyback but not enough to prove the LNG thesis; in that case, hold for one more winter and watch whether the new export terminals actually pull on domestic supply. The upside is fatter if the timing works: new LNG capacity is real, the rock is cheap, and the market prices this as perpetually range-bound. The downside is permanent if the company keeps borrowing to buy back stock into a soft market.

The bet is still that Appalachian gas stays expensive enough for Gulfport's cheap wells to throw off cash, and that the company shrinks the share count without over-borrowing to do it. What breaks it is $2.89 gas that does not recover. The one pair to watch is realized price against long-term debt: if the price line falls while the debt line rises for two more quarters, the bet is wrong.

Methodology

Prose current to the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, period ended 2026-06-30; price and multiples as of Sep 6, 2026.

Q4 2025 revenue, net income, and EPS are derived as FY2025 less the first nine months from filed figures; the vendor feed omits that quarter.

Bet-block valuation history uses the pack's five-year P/FCF series (current 8.1x, low end of range, peer near 9.4x), the longest record available since the 2021 emergence from Chapter 11.

Insider figures are the trailing-twelve-month Form 4 record; the dominant seller is Silver Point Capital, a post-bankruptcy holder, not operating management.

Sources: GPOR Q2 2026 10-Q; as-filed XBRL quarterly and annual series; FMP quote, ratios, key-metrics, consensus, and insider endpoints. Filing figures outrank vendor fields where they differ.

Fact check: P/E corrected from 7.2x to 7.1x (vendor ratio 7.119 rounds to 7.1x). All bundle financials reconciled to XBRL and filing; operational metrics verified against 10-Q text; insider figures verified against pack. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.

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