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Company report

Hims & Hers Health, Inc. HIMS

Three-pass checked

The bet you're really making is that Hims & Hers keeps signing up people who want treatment for the things they would rather not raise at a pharmacy counter, hair, sex, skin, and now weight, and bills each one every month for the refill. You're betting it can add the weight-loss shot without wrecking the older business that actually earns money. Right now it is not going well: a record quarter, revenue up 38% to $753.2M, and still an $86.3M loss, because the company keeps far less of each sales dollar than it did a year ago. You pay about two and a half times sales, and nothing times earnings, because after two profitable years the company is losing money again.

Key data

Price$27.71
52-week range$13.74 – $65.30
P/E (TTM)−44.2x
P/S (TTM)2.4x

HIMS · price with moving averages

Daily · 6MWeekly · 3Y
$1$18$35$52$69 Oct '23May '24Dec '24Jul '25Feb '26Oct '26 Bid Cap
EMAs82140

Source: market data.

The business

Hims & Hers is a subscription drugstore that runs on a phone. You answer a questionnaire, sometimes upload a photo, a licensed clinician reviews it and writes a prescription, and a labeled bottle arrives every month. It started with the two things men will pay to avoid discussing in person, hair loss and erectile dysfunction, both treated with cheap generics like finasteride and sildenafil. It then added skincare, mental health, and the category that changed the story, weight loss built on GLP-1 medication. The money is the recurring bill: spend heavily to acquire a subscriber, then collect a monthly charge for as long as they keep refilling. Because the drugs are mostly generic, each order is cheap to fill, so the model lives on two numbers, the cost to land a customer and how long that customer stays. The moat is brand plus habit, most people do not reshop once the routine works, reinforced by Hims owning more of its own pharmacies and fulfillment.

The numbers

Two things happened at once this year, and they point in opposite directions.

QuarterRevenue, $MNet income, $MDiluted EPS
Q2 2025544.842.5$0.17
Q3 2025599.015.8$0.06
Q4 2025617.820.6$0.08
Q1 2026608.1−92.1−$0.40
Q2 2026753.2−86.3−$0.37

The top line has never been stronger. Q2 2026 revenue of $753.2M was a record, up 38% on the year and 24% on the quarter. But the profit line inverted. After earning money in every quarter of 2025, the company lost $92.1M in Q1 and $86.3M in Q2 2026, where analysts had penciled in roughly breakeven. The inflection is Q1 2026, when operating income first turned negative. The last read flagged exactly this split, revenue growth and operating income moving opposite ways, and said the December print would settle which was lying. No quarter has reported since, so it stays unresolved, and Q2's record revenue against a $97.2M operating loss only widened the gap.

YearRevenue, $BNet income, $MDiluted EPS
20210.27−107.7−$0.58
20220.53−65.7−$0.32
20230.87−23.5−$0.11
20241.48126.0$0.53
20252.35128.4$0.51
2026, 1H1.36−178.4−$0.77

Step back and the growth is real: revenue compounded about 64% a year from 2022 to 2025 and turned two straight years of profit. The 1H 2026 loss of $178.4M is the whole question, growth investment or reset. The table below shows where the money went.

PeriodGross marginOp. marginS&M, % rev
Q2 202576.4%4.9%40.0%
FY 202573.8%4.5%39.2%
Q1 202649.4%−2.7%36.5%
Q2 202663.8%−12.9%34.8%

The surprise is that marketing is not the culprit. Selling and marketing actually fell as a share of revenue, from 40% to 35%. The damage sits above it: the company kept about 76 cents of each sales dollar a year ago and 64 cents last quarter, with Q1 down at 49 cents, while general and administrative cost more than doubled year over year. That pattern fits a mix shift into weight loss, where the medicine is expensive and the margin on it thin. The view here, which the price does not share, is that the 2025 profit was real operating leverage and H1 2026 is the cost of bolting on a large, low-margin category, not the end of the model. The one print that settles it is gross margin. If it climbs back toward 70% by year end, the reset fear is wrong.

Management

Andrew Dudum founded the company and still runs it, and the operating record is genuinely strong, revenue up more than fourfold in three years. Two things sit against him. Growth came partly from the share count, up 26% in three years, so per-share progress lags the headline. And capital allocation reads poorly right now: the company spent $90.0M on buybacks in 2025 at an average price around $44, against $27.71 today, paying up near the peak. Dudum's 2025 pay was $23.0M, about 18% of that year's net income and nearly double his 2023 package, weighted with an $11.0M option grant, in a year the stock fell hard and the business slid back into losses. Insiders sold about $5.6M over the past year and bought nothing, though the amount is small against a $6.2B market value, and the filings here do not separate planned sales from discretionary ones, so read it as a shrug, not a signal.

How it fails or surprises you

The margin never comes back. If the sub-64% gross margin of last quarter is the new structure rather than a transition, the whole P&L is a marketing machine with no profit underneath. At 2.4 times sales that is expensive for a business that keeps nothing. The print: quarterly gross margin holding below 65% into 2027.

Growth that does not pay. The fact this read explains least: revenue accelerated to +38% while operating income fell from +$26.7M to −$97.2M in a year. A company that grows faster while losing more is either buying a great new market or buying revenue that never earns. If selling and marketing has to keep climbing just to hold the growth rate while margin stays down, the read here is wrong and this is the latter.

Weight loss at scale (right tail). If Hims turns its subscriber base into a durable, legal weight-loss franchise and cross-sells even a modest share of members into it at a repaired margin, 2027 earnings power would dwarf anything visible today. The market is not paying for it because the H1 losses frightened it off. The print that reveals it first: weight-loss revenue disclosed as a growing line with gross margin stabilizing alongside it.

Closing thoughts

This is an uncertainty one print resolves, not an exposure you can only survive. Demand is not in doubt, the customers keep coming, but the unit economics went sideways the moment the company leaned into weight loss. The distribution turns on one variable, gross margin. If it recovers, 2.4 times sales looks generous for a 40% grower that has already shown it can earn a profit. If it does not, you own a fast-growing company that converts none of it to cash, and the losses compound. The downside is bounded for now, free cash flow is still positive and cash on hand covers the current burn, while the upside, if weight loss works at a decent margin, is a multiple of today's price. Judgment, not arithmetic: the fatter tail is up, because the demand is proven and the margin question is answerable within a quarter or two, though the left tail sits close enough that the answer matters more than usual.

The bet, restated: Hims keeps signing people up for hair, sex, skin, and weight and bills them every month, and now it has to prove the weight-loss shot can ride that same machine without eating the profit the rest of it makes. What breaks it is one pair of numbers, gross margin against revenue growth. If the growth holds and the margin comes back, the bet pays. If the growth needs ever more spending while the margin stays down, it does not. Watch gross margin when the next quarter prints.

Sector frame per the company's own filings. Anchored to the most recent Form 10-Q (period ended Jun 30, 2026) and 10-K on EDGAR as of Sep 6, 2026, with income, balance sheet and cash flow figures taken as filed. Price, 52-week range and multiples are vendor-sourced market data as of Sep 6, 2026. Quarterly year-over-year sequences and any figure described as derived are computed from as-filed data and labeled where they appear. Items the filings do not disclose are stated as not disclosed rather than estimated. Documentation prepared with AI assistance. Not investment advice. Fact check: All numerical claims verified against FMP ground-truth data; CEO and executive compensation verified; zero errors detected. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.

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