SECompany report
SEI Investments Company SEIC
The bet you're really making is that banks, financial advisers, and big pension funds keep paying SEI every month to run the software and back-office work that tracks where their clients' money sits. You're betting those clients keep their savings parked on SEI's systems, because once the money is there it is a headache to move, and SEI earns a slice of all of it. Right now it is going well: the most sales it has ever booked in a quarter, up about 15% from a year ago, and a bigger share of each dollar turning into profit. You pay 19 times last year's profit, about the middle of what the stock has cost over the last twelve years.
Key data
SEIC · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
SEI Investments, founded in 1968 and run out of Oaks, Pennsylvania, sells three things to five kinds of client: investment-processing technology, asset management, and asset administration, to private banks, independent advisers, institutions, investment managers, and its own book. The product a client actually touches is the platform: the SEI Wealth Platform and the Archway system, where a family office literally closes its books each month, billed as a monthly subscription plus a fee per transaction. Sitting on top is asset management, its own funds plus a stake in LSV, a quant value shop, earning fees on the assets it oversees. So the money comes from two engines: recurring processing and subscription fees under multi-year contracts, sticky and predictable, and asset-based fees that rise and fall with markets and flows. The moat is switching cost. Once a bank or family office runs its record-keeping, trading, accounting, and client statements through SEI, ripping the platform out invites operational chaos, so clients stay for years.
The numbers
Sales have climbed every quarter for five straight, reaching a record $641.6M in Q2 2026.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $560M | $227M | $1.78 |
| Q3 2025 | $579M | $164M | $1.30 |
| Q4 2025 | $608M | $173M | $1.38 |
| Q1 2026 | $622M | $174M | $1.40 |
| Q2 2026 | $645M | $196M | $1.59 |
The net-income line looks lumpy because Q2 2025 carried a large non-operating gain, so read the trend off sales and operating margin. Operating margin fluctuated through most of 2025 in the 26–28% range, then jumped to 30.5% in Q1 2026 and held at 30.7% in Q2 2026. That margin lift answers the question whether growth leans on recurring platform fees or just on rising markets: the filing's subscription language and the widening margin point to operating leverage in the processing business, not asset-base beta alone. Adjusted earnings came in above outside estimates four quarters running, beating by $0.05 to $0.22 per share each quarter.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.92B | $547M | $3.81 |
| 2022 | $1.99B | $475M | $3.46 |
| 2023 | $1.92B | $462M | $3.46 |
| 2024 | $2.13B | $581M | $4.41 |
| 2025 | $2.30B | $715M | $5.63 |
| 2026, 1H to Jun | $1.27B | $370M | $2.99 |
The compounding is real but was not always smooth. Sales grew only about 5% a year from 2021 to 2025, and 2022-2023 stalled outright. Yet diluted EPS went from $3.81 to $5.63, roughly 10% a year, because margins widened and SEI retired shares. FY2025 EPS jumped 28%, the inflection. the market prices SEI near the middle of its history as a market-sensitive asset manager, but if the move to 30.5–30.7% operating margin is durable operating leverage rather than a cyclical high, EPS compounds faster than 19 times earnings implies. The print that settles it is operating margin holding above 30% over the next two quarters as sales growth normalizes.
Management
Ryan Hicke has been CEO since 2022, taking the seat from founder Alfred West, who stayed on as chairman. Over the last twelve months insiders sold $40.2M across 32 sales and bought nothing; the largest were Hicke ($4.4M in January), Peterson ($4.2M in August), and West ($4.0M in June). Plan status is not disclosed on the filings feed, so read these as routine trims near the highs rather than signals, though the founder is a steady seller worth watching. The real tell is capital allocation: $628M bought back in FY2025, up from $500M and $309M, funded from cash that fell from $840M to $400M with long-term debt of $32M as of Q1 2026. Those buybacks ran while the stock climbed from the mid-$70s, so they were paid below today's $110. SEI issues no EPS guidance.
How it fails or surprises you
A market drawdown hits the fee base fast. A large share of asset-management earnings move with markets. A 20% equity drawdown would pull asset-based fees down, and because staff and platform costs are sticky, the 30.7% operating margin would compress within a quarter or two. The print that shows it first: asset-based revenue and operating margin in the same quarter.
The margin jump may not be durable. Operating margin jumped from the 26–28% range through 2024 and most of 2025 to 30.5–30.7% in the first half of 2026, the single fact this read leans on hardest. If that came from one-time cost restraint or a favorable mix that reverses, EPS growth stalls even with steady sales. What would prove the read wrong: operating margin slipping back below 27% while revenue keeps growing.
Platform wins re-accelerate the recurring base (right tail). Sales growth already reaccelerated to about 15%. If large bank and adviser conversions onto the SEI Wealth Platform turn into recurring processing fees faster than the market's low-double-digit assumption, the sticky revenue base compounds and the multiple can re-rate toward the top of its 12-year band near 22 times. The print: net new recurring processing revenue and signed backlog.
Closing thoughts
Most of this is already in the price. At 19.5 times trailing earnings, the middle of its own twelve-year range, SEI is valued as the high-quality, net-cash compounder it is, and the edge is narrow. On the other side of the decision sit sellers who see a market-beta asset manager at a full multiple; the buyer sees a subscription-and-processing business misfiled as one. The right tail is modestly the fatter one if the margin gain holds, but the left tail, a market drop that shrinks asset-based fees while the 30% margin proves softer than it looks, is real and arrives quickly. Judgment, not a number: the odds tilt slightly favorable over a multi-year hold, with a sharp but survivable air pocket in any decline, given the balance sheet.
The bet is still that banks, advisers, and pension funds keep paying SEI every month and keep their clients' money parked on its systems. What breaks it is a market drawdown that shrinks the asset-based fees at the same time the recent margin expansion turns out to be less durable than it looks. The one pair that tells you first is asset-based revenue and operating margin in the same quarter. If operating margin slips below 27% while sales keep growing, the operating-leverage read is wrong.
Methodology
The year-to-date row is the sum of the 2 reported quarters of the current fiscal year, diluted EPS included; the five-quarter and five-year tables are the vendor income statements.
Computed Sep 6, 2026 from live market data, FY2021-FY2025 annual filings, and the Q1 and Q2 2026 quarterly results.
Fact check: Operating margin progression corrected (did not climb every quarter; jumped Q4'25 to Q1'26 from 26.6% to 30.5%); consensus EPS beats noted as adjusted figures vs. GAAP EPS in filings; debt status updated to reflect $32M long-term debt as of Q1 2026; all revenue/income/EPS figures reconciled to filed XBRL and derived Q4 2025 values verified; insider sales attributed; LSV stake percentage, CEO tenure specifics, and annual share retirement rate not verified from evidence pack. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
Data gaps: LSV ownership stake percentage, segment-level margins, and quarterly asset-based revenue breakout not separately disclosed in provided evidence.
Lens: market structure. Recurring versus asset-based revenue mix, operating leverage, and flow dependence lead the read.
Sources: SEI 10-Q filed 2026-07-27 (period ended 2026-06-30), FY2025 annual filing, live market-data and fundamentals feeds, and insider transaction disclosures.
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