LVCompany report
LVMH Moët Hennessy - Louis Vuitton, Société Européenne LVMHF
The bet you're really making is that people who want a Louis Vuitton bag or a bottle of Dom Pérignon keep wanting them, and keep paying more for them, even when times are tight. You're betting the world's richest shoppers, above all in China and America, come back to spending after two soft years. Right now it is going the wrong way, but slowly: profit per share slipped about 2% over the past year while the stock fell by a third. You pay 20 times earnings, near the low end of what the company has cost over the past twelve years.
Key data
LVMHF · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
LVMH is the largest luxury group in the world, about 75 houses run in five buckets: fashion and leather (Louis Vuitton and Dior, the profit engine), wines and spirits (Moët, Hennessy, Dom Pérignon), perfumes and cosmetics, watches and jewelry (Tiffany, Bulgari), and the shops that sell it all (Sephora, DFS). The Arnault family controls close to half the company and every major decision, and has for four decades. The money is made on one thing: a name people will pay far more for than the object costs to make. Gross margin sits at 66%, and the price of a Louis Vuitton Neverfull rose several times straight through the last two soft years rather than fall. The moat is a stable of brands whose desirability has compounded for a century and cannot be bought or rebuilt, only inherited. Store count and the exact segment profit split were not pulled this run.
The numbers
LVMH reports twice a year, not quarterly, so the sequence below is the reported half-years.
| Period | Diluted EPS | vs est |
|---|---|---|
| H2 2024 | 10.95 | -15.5% |
| H1 2025 | 13.45 | -5.0% |
| H2 2025 | 12.25 | +4.2% |
| H1 2026 | 13.15 | +7.2% |
Read the halves and one thing stands out: profit per share stopped growing more than two years ago and has drifted sideways to lower, yet the last two reported halves came in above what analysts penciled. Expectations were cut hard enough that a flat business now clears the bar. H1 2026 earned 13.15 against 13.45 a year earlier, down about 2%.
| Period | Diluted EPS | P/E at $500.64 |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 reported | 25.70 | 19.5x |
| Trailing 12 months | 25.40 | 19.7x |
| FY2027E | 25.03 | 20.0x |
| FY2028E | 27.56 | 18.2x |
Across a full year the picture is the same: FY2025 earned 25.70, the trailing twelve months 25.40, and the analyst set does not pencil the FY2025 level being reclaimed until 2028. That is the whole debate. The market pays 20 times earnings for a business expected to grow earnings about 4% to 5% a year through 2028, roughly €84B of sales becoming €89B, plus dividends and steady buybacks. Priced that way, this is a slow compounder that has stopped compounding, on sale.
What I think the market has wrong: it is treating two soft years as the new baseline. Luxury demand runs in cycles, and the operating leverage in these houses means a return to even mid-single-digit organic growth drops through to earnings faster than the flat estimate line implies. The single print that settles it is fashion and leather organic growth turning positive. Until it does, the bears are right on the tape.
Management
Bernard Arnault, 77 this year, and his family control about 48% of the company, so the people running it own it, which is the alignment you want and rarely get. No insider buying or selling registered in the vendor feed over the past twelve months, and CEO pay was not disclosed in this pull, so I will not guess at it. What the record shows is debt held at 1.2 times cash earnings with interest covered about sixteen times over, and free cash flow near €12B a year that funds a rising dividend and buybacks. Arnault has spent forty years buying desirable brands cheaply in downturns and never selling them. A soft patch is when this operator is at his most useful.
How it fails or surprises you
Chinese and aspirational demand keeps fading. The watch-item from two days ago, organic growth negative and house margins soft, has not turned: H1 2026 profit per share fell about 2% and the stock kept sliding to a fresh 52-week low near $494. If the next reported half again shows organic growth negative and fashion margins under pressure, the two-year fade is a demand reset, not a trough.
The multiple de-rates on flat earnings. At 20 times with profit per share going nowhere, the risk is not an earnings collapse but a re-rating. Slip toward the mid-teens the group touched in past troughs and you lose 20% to 25% with earnings unchanged. The floor is brand strength and a 7% free-cash yield, not the multiple.
China and America turn together (right tail). If the richest shoppers in the two biggest markets return at once, organic growth swings positive and the operating leverage carries FY2028 earnings past the €27.6 pencil while the multiple climbs back toward its usual 25 to 29 times. That combination is worth roughly half again the current price, and nothing today pays for it.
Closing thoughts
The next reported half's organic growth for fashion and leather settles the whole question. Positive and the recovery case is live, negative again and the sideways grind continues. Near term the left tail is fatter, because there is no visible catalyst and momentum still points down, and another 20% de-rate is the real downside if demand keeps fading. But this is a cycle, not a solvency question: a family-owned balance sheet, sixteen-times interest cover and €12B of yearly cash mean you are paid about 7% to wait. This is the same setup luxury offered in 2015 and early 2020, written off just before it wasn't. Against a fatter near-term downside sits an upside worth about half again the price if the cycle turns, at a multiple rarely this low.
The bet is still that people who want a Louis Vuitton bag or a bottle of Dom Pérignon keep wanting them and keep paying more for them, and the world's richest shoppers, above all in China and America, come back to spending after two soft years. What breaks it is the aspirational buyer stepping down for good, with organic growth staying negative through 2027. The one pair that tells you first is fashion and leather organic growth and that division's operating margin. If both are still falling this time next year, the slide was structural and the cheap multiple was correct.
Methodology
Sector frame: consumer luxury, judged on organic demand and unit-level house margins rather than reported revenue, which currency distorts.
Data gaps: LVMH reports semi-annually, so the period tables are half-years; segment organic growth, fashion-and-leather margins, store count and CEO pay were not pulled this run; FY2027 and FY2028 figures are the analyst set, not reported.
Bundle: FMP fundamentals in EUR through H1 2026 (period ended 2026-06-30); price, market cap and P/E in USD via the LVMHF OTC line. Revenue, margin, EBITDA, net debt and free cash flow derived from as-filed TTM ratios.
Sources: consensus EPS actuals and estimates for the four reported half-years; vendor ratios and key metrics for margins, leverage, coverage, free cash flow and valuation history.
Fact check: 1 correction (FY27E revenue €84B not €80B); all EPS, P/E, margin, leverage and yield figures reconciled to FMP vendor data; Arnault age and family ownership percentage not web-verified this run. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
Bid Cap
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