ROCompany report
Roper Technologies, Inc. ROP
The bet you're really making is that Roper keeps buying small software companies that each run one industry, a courtroom, a hospital lab, a construction bid desk, and that those customers never leave. You're betting it keeps finding enough of them to buy at fair prices, because the businesses it already owns grow only about 10% a year on their own and the rest of the growth is bought. Right now it is going well: the biggest revenue quarter in the company's history, up 8.5%, with operating margin slipping about half a point as selling costs rise. You pay about 17 times next year's earnings, and on sales the stock is priced near the cheapest it has looked in twelve years.
Key data
ROP · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
Roper is a holding company that owns roughly thirty software and instrument businesses, each dominant in one narrow niche. The software it sells is the system a customer runs the whole operation on: the docket software a county court files cases in, the software a freight broker books loads with, the platform a lab reports results through. Once installed, ripping it out means retraining everyone and risking the core workflow, so almost nobody does. That is the moat, switching cost, and it shows up as gross margins in the mid-to-high 80s on the pure-software lines. Roper does not chase organic growth; it lets the owned businesses grow high-single to low-double digits, harvests the cash, and spends that cash plus borrowings buying the next niche leader. The business is really a disciplined capital-allocation machine wearing a software company's margins.
The numbers
Revenue is a steady climb, and the last five quarters read clean until the bottom line distorts. Q2 2026 GAAP net income of $1.17B and $11.62 diluted EPS carry a large one-time gain, roughly $630M, so the operating figures and the $5.38 adjusted EPS are the honest read.
| Quarter | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $1.94B | $378M | $3.49 |
| Q3 2025 | $2.02B | $399M | $3.68 |
| Q4 2025 | $2.06B | $428M | $3.97 |
| Q1 2026 | $2.10B | $509M | $4.87 |
| Q2 2026 | $2.11B | $1.17B | $11.48 |
Revenue grew 8.5% in Q2 and 9.9% across the first half, with adjusted EPS beating the Street each of the last four quarters, the widest by ten cents in Q2. Operating income rose 6.6%, slightly behind revenue, so margin slipped about half a point to 27.7% as SG&A climbed, most visibly in Network Software.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $4.83B | $1.10B | $10.30 |
| 2022 | $5.37B | $1.19B | $11.13 |
| 2023 | $6.18B | $1.36B | $12.70 |
| 2024 | $7.04B | $1.55B | $14.35 |
| 2025 | $7.90B | $1.54B | $14.20 |
| 2026, 1H to Jun | $4.20B | $1.68B | $16.35 |
The 2022 spike was a divestiture gain, not the business; ignore it. On the operating line the compounding is real: revenue up 13% a year since 2021, operating income up from $1.24B to $2.24B with margin widening from 25.7% to 28.3%, and free cash flow near $2.6B, a 6.4% yield. That is the machine, buy vertical software at low-to-mid-teens cash flow, fund it with debt now at 2.4x EBITDA and 5.9x interest coverage, and let recurring revenue compound.
| Segment (1H26) | Revenue | Growth YoY | Gross margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application Software | $2.37B | +9.7% | 69.4% |
| Network Software | $0.86B | +12.8% | 84.3% |
| Tech Enabled Products | $0.97B | +7.9% | 56.9% |
The Application Software line, the one to watch from six weeks ago, held: it grew 9.7% in the first half, though the filing still does not split how much was organic versus acquired, which is the load-bearing gap in the whole story. Total remaining performance obligations stand at $5.22B, with $3.29B, or 63%, due to convert inside twelve months. What the market believes and I do not: that this is a decelerating acquirer worth a shrinking multiple. The single print that settles it is segment organic growth against the trailing-year M&A tally.
Management
CEO Neil Hunn runs the record the company should be judged on, capital deployment, and it just shifted. Roper, which for years plowed every dollar into acquisitions, bought back $500M of stock in 2025 and roughly $1.5B more in early 2026, and it did so with the shares near a twelve-year-low sales multiple, which is the right time to do it. Insiders sold about $19M and bought $5.6M over the year; Hunn sold $10.3M in mid-November then purchased $3.6M the next day, plan status not disclosed, a sell-then-buy pattern that reads like an option exercise followed by an open-market add. Debt rose about $1.7B in 2025 to fund deals, the expected cost of the model, not a warning by itself.
How it fails or surprises you
Organic growth quietly stalls. If the roughly 10% the owned software generates on its own decays toward mid-single digits, Roper must buy bigger and pay up to hold the top line while $11.3B of debt keeps accruing. The print: any quarter organic growth is disclosed below 6%, or stops being disclosed at all.
The deal pipeline dries or reprices. The algorithm needs $2B to $3B a year deployed into vertical software at low-to-mid-teens multiples, and private equity wants the same assets. A year of no deals, or deals struck above 20x, breaks the growth math with interest coverage already at 5.9x. The print: the trailing four-quarter deployment total and multiples paid.
A large platform lands (right tail). The Q2 gain of about $630M, on top of $2.6B annual free cash flow, hands Roper its most firepower in years. One accretive vertical-software platform bought at a fair price re-rates the stock back toward its 5.3x-to-8.7x historical sales band. The print: a $2B-plus acquisition announced at a disclosed sub-16x cash-flow multiple.
Closing thoughts
One number decides whether the cheapness is a value trap or a re-rate: Application Software's organic growth rate. Roper sits at 4.8x sales against a 5.3x-to-8.7x twelve-year band, precisely while operating margin and free cash flow sit at highs, so the discount is a bet against future organic growth, not against cash generation. If organic is disclosed near 10% alongside steady M&A deployment, the multiple reprices higher; if total growth holds near 9% but the organic split stays undisclosed, the stock drifts; if organic slips below mid-single digits or deal flow dries up, the left tail opens. The fatter tail leans modestly up, because the multiple already prices disappointment, but the left tail is real: debt-funded dealmaking slowing into a market where software assets reprice higher strains the growth engine and the balance sheet together.
The bet is still that Roper keeps buying one-industry software companies whose customers never leave, and keeps finding them at fair prices. What breaks it is organic growth sliding below mid-single digits or deal flow drying up, and the one pair that tells you first is Application Software organic growth against the trailing four-quarter M&A spend. If organic is disclosed and holding near 10% a year from here, the cheapness was the opportunity, not the warning.
Methodology
The year-to-date row is the sum of the 2 reported quarters of the current fiscal year, diluted EPS included; the five-quarter and five-year tables are the vendor income statements.
Sector frame: diversified vertical-software compounder valued on FCF yield and EV/EBITDA against the serial-acquirer peer set, where the load-bearing facts are Application Software organic growth and M&A deployment cadence.
Data gaps: Q4 2025 quarter derived as FY2025 less the first nine months from filed figures; segment organic-versus-acquired split not disclosed in the pulled 10-Q; Q2 2026 GAAP EPS carries a large one-time gain, roughly $630M, not itemized in the pulled filing text, so analysis leans on adjusted EPS ($5.38) and operating income; SBC about 2.3% of revenue.
Bundle: FY2021 to FY2025 annual and Q2 2025 to Q2 2026 quarterly income, plus TTM ratios, valuation history, and insider window through Nov 2025, as of Sep 6, 2026.
Sources: FMP quote, ratios, key-metrics, consensus, valuation-history and insider endpoints; ROP Q2 2026 10-Q filed July 31, 2026, and 8-K filed Aug 10, 2026.
Fact check: all financials reconciled to filed XBRL; Q2 one-time gain corrected to $630M (was $770M); all derived metrics verified against filing. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
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