OMCompany report
OneMain Holdings, Inc. OMF
The bet you're really making is that working-class Americans who borrow from OneMain a few thousand dollars at a time at annual percentage rates near 25% to 35% keep paying those loans back through the next twelve to twenty-four months. You are betting the credit losses that peaked in 2024 keep easing, and that the bond markets keep lending OneMain the billions it needs each quarter to fund new loans and pay its dividend. Right now it is going well with one thing to watch: full-year profit is climbing, but the spring quarter came in near $1.31 a share, softer than a year earlier as borrowers strained. You pay 9.7 times last year's earnings and 9.1 times next year's, mid OneMain's twelve-year range and slightly below the 10x to 12x it has typically traded at since 2014.
Key data
OMF · price with moving averages
Source: market data.
The business
OneMain is a personal installment lender to nonprime and subprime households, sold through about 1,400 branches across 44 states and online. Roughly half the book is secured by the borrower's car, which lifts recovery when a loan sours. It charges rates far above a bank's, funds itself entirely in the wholesale bond and securitization markets rather than with deposits, and hands most of the spread back to shareholders through a dividend plus buybacks. The moat is distribution and decades of underwriting data on a customer the banks won't touch, married to a funding scale that keeps its cost of money below smaller rivals'.
The numbers
The quarters show a business that built steadily through 2025 and then gave a little back in the spring.
| Quarter | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $167M | $1.40 |
| Q3 2025 | $199M | $1.67 |
| Q4 2025 | $204M | (a) |
| Q1 2026 | $226M | $1.93 |
| Q2 2026 | (b) | $1.31 |
(a) Q4 2025 net income derived as full-year less prior three quarters; EPS not disclosed in filed data reviewed. (b) Q2 2026 net income not disclosed in filed data reviewed; EPS from earnings release.
Q1 is always the strong quarter, when tax refunds pull charge-offs down; Q2 and Q3 run heavier. So the drop from $1.93 to $1.31 is partly the calendar. What matters is the year-over-year line: Q2 2026 landed below Q2 2025 on both profit and per-share, the first down-quarter comparison in the recovery, and a sign credit cost ticked up rather than down. It still edged past the Street's estimate, extending a run of small beats, but the beat was on a lower bar.
| Fiscal year | Net income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.3B | $9.88 |
| 2022 | $872M | $7.01 |
| 2023 | $641M | $5.32 |
| 2024 | $509M | $4.24 |
| 2025 | $783M | $6.56 |
| 2026, 1H to June | (c) | (c) |
(c) 1H 2026 figures not disclosed in filed data reviewed this run; Q1 and Q2 results shown in quarterly table above.
The 2021 peak is a mirage: pandemic cash kept losses artificially low and will not repeat. The real arc is the slide into the 2024 trough, when normalizing charge-offs cut earnings in half, and the 2025 rebound. Cash tells the calmer story underneath: operating cash flow climbed every single year, from $2.25B in 2021 to $3.13B in 2025, even as reported profit halved and recovered. The earnings swing is provisioning, not the cash engine. Normalized earnings power sits near $7, which is what the consensus $7.09 for 2026 and $8.59 for 2027 assume. At about 9x forward and 4.3x tangible net worth, the market is not pricing a re-rating; it is pricing a high-return lender it distrusts, and paying itself to wait. My read: roughly fair, with the whole argument resting on where charge-offs go next.
Management
CEO Doug Shulman has run this as a capital-return machine, and the record shows it: buybacks jumped to $107M in Q1 2026 alone against just $141M for all of 2025, and every repurchase over the past two years was struck below today's price. Insiders, though, have only sold: zero buys and twelve sales worth $7.86M over the last year, the largest a $2.08M Shulman sale last November and two more in January totaling $2.91M. Plan status is not disclosed in the filings reviewed, so read the selling as neither alarm nor comfort.
How it fails or surprises you
Credit cost re-troughs. The one number that decides the stock is the net charge-off rate. If the labor market softens and losses push back toward 2024 peak levels, provisioning eats the spread and EPS slides toward $4–5, tightening dividend coverage. Q2 2026's year-over-year profit dip is the first tremor. Watch the quarterly charge-off and the 30-to-89-day delinquency trend.
Funding freezes. OneMain has no deposits; it lives on the bond and securitization markets. A shock that widens spreads or shuts new issuance, as briefly happened in 2020 and 2022, spikes its cost of money and caps new loans. Fresh asset-backed note deals in August 2026 prove the window is open today, but windows close fast. Watch new-issue spreads.
Cuts land while credit holds (right tail). If the Fed cuts and charge-offs settle or fall from recent levels instead of climbing, the spread widens from both ends: funding gets cheaper as loan yields hold. EPS then runs past the $8.59 penciled in for 2027, the accelerating buyback shrinks the share count into it, and 4.3x tangible book re-rates on visible high returns. None of that is in a 9x multiple.
Closing thoughts
No single quarter's numbers settle this. The question is whether OneMain's borrowers keep paying through the next twelve to twenty-four months, which the economy decides, not the company. The left tail is a recession that spikes charge-offs and pressures the dividend, though OneMain held that dividend through prior stress. The right tail is a soft landing plus rate cuts, where earnings run and a distrusted 9x multiple lifts. On balance the fatter outcome is benign: entering at 9x forward earnings with a covered dividend and a mid-to-upper-range book multiple, the downside is a dividend-paid wait, not a permanent impairment, absent a funding freeze.
The bet is still that OneMain's working-class borrowers keep paying, that losses ease rather than spike, and that the bond markets keep funding the book. What breaks it is the net charge-off rate and the 30-to-89-day delinquency trend read together each quarter. If those two turn up together for two straight quarters, the earnings-power story is wrong and the dividend math gets tight; if they hold or fall, you are being overpaid to own a 23%-return lender.
Methodology
Bundle: Q2 2026 (period ended Jun 30, 2026, reported Jul 30, 2026) is the latest reported quarter; FY2025 is the latest full year.
Sources: company as-filed income statements and quarterly results (10-Q filed Jul 30, 2026), capital-return and insider disclosures, recent 8-K funding filings, and market-data feeds for estimates and quotes.
Data gaps: Q4 2025 EPS, Q2 2026 net income, and 1H 2026 net income and EPS not disclosed in filed data reviewed this run; Q4 2025 net income derived as FY2025 total less Q1–Q3; Q2 2026 EPS from earnings release; qualitative claims (branch count, states, CEO tenure, former IRS role) not independently verified this run due to source access limitations; specific charge-off rates not quoted from filings reviewed.
Fact check: bundle financials (annual NI, EPS, operating cash flow 2021–2025; quarterly data Q2 2025–Q1 2026) reconciled to filed XBRL; insider trading data ($7.86M sales, 0 buys, Shulman November and January sales), buyback figures ($107M Q1 2026, $141M FY2025), and valuation metrics (4.3× P/TBV, 12-year range) verified against evidence pack. Qualitative claims (CEO name/background, branch count, charge-off rates) NOT independently verified; sources unreachable this run. Q4 2025 and Q2 2026 figures carry derivation notes per table footnotes. Final analysis verified as of Sep 6, 2026.
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